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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Patrick O'Neil appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion for appointment of counsel and by summarily dismissing his petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2011, Mr. O'Neil was convicted of possession of stolen property and received 
a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., p.1.) In 2012 he filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.1.) He alleged that his trial counsel was 
ineffective and that a detective withheld mitigating information. (R., p.2.) 
Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. O'Neil alleged that his attorney 
would not correspond with him, had induced his plea by promising a rider, had agreed 
to an amount of restitution without consulting him, and persuaded him to plead guilty 
because he could have received a life sentence. (R., p.3.) 
Mr. O'Neil then elaborated: He asserted that his attorney was ineffective for 
entering into a restitution agreement without his knowledge or consent, for refusing his 
calls and refusing to provide him discovery, for failing to file a motion to suppress, and 
to attach letters or certificates in support of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35) motion. (R., p.5.) Mr. O'Neil also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. 
(R., p.12.) 
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The State filed an answer. (R., p.36.) The district court then filed a notice of 
intent to dismiss. (R., p.42.) Regarding the motion for appointment of counsel, the 
district court ruled: 
Mr. O'Neil did not offer any specific facts as to the basis of his motion for 
the appointment of counsel. Instead, the Petitioner relied on general 
contentions regarding his inability to represent himself. Thus, this Court 
cannot assess the merits of his claim and therefore must deem his motion 
to be frivolous on its face. Consequently, after taking every inference in 
the Petitioner's favor and considering the request for counsel, including a 
consideration regarding whether this case appears to be one in which 
counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner, this Court must deny 
the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
(R., p.46.) Regarding the merits of the petition, this district court stated that, "petitioner 
did not offer any specific facts or evidence showing ineffectiveness, or even make any 
specific argument that his attorney was actually deficient. Mr. O'Neil did not offer any 
specific facts or make any argument as to how his was prejudiced by any deficient 
conduct." (R., p.52.) 
Mr. O'Neil responded to the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.58.) Regarding the 
court's assertion that he had not submitted any evidence in support of his petition, 
Mr. O'Neil pointed out that he attached a police report detailing the incident at issue in 
this case as Exhibit 2. (R., p.59.) He also asserted that Exhibit 3 was attached to his 
petition. (R., p.60.) Exhibit 3 is the transcript of the sentencing hearing in which 
Mr. O'Neil's attorney informed the court that the amount of restitution was in dispute and 
that the issue needed to be resolved in a hearing. Mr. O'Neil then again asserted that 
his attorney later stipulated to a restitution amount without his knowledge or consent. 
(R., p.60.) Mr. O'Neil asserted that restitution was unwarranted because the restitution 
figures were for crimes he did not commit and that the items found in his possession 
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were returned to the owner. (R., p.60.) He felt his attorney picked the lesser of the two 
amounts when in fact neither amount was appropriate. (R., p.61.) 
The court then dismissed the petition (R., p.67.) Regarding the appointment of 
counsel, the court determined that Mr. O'Neil's claims were frivolous. (R., p.71.) 
Regarding the merits of the petition, the court again concluded that Mr. O'Neil had not 
presented any evidence that counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced by any 
deficiency and had only made bare and conclusory allegations. (R., pp. 72-73.) 
Mr. O'Neil appealed. (R., p.75.) He asserts that the district court erred by both 
denying his motion for appointment of counsel and by summarily dismissing his petition. 
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ISSUES 
1, Did the district court err by denying Mr. O'Neil's motion for appointment of 
counsel? 





The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. O'Neil's Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
Mr. O'Neil asserts that he raised the possibility of a valid claim and, therefore, the 
district court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel. 
When a petitioner in a post-conviction action requests the assistance of a 
court-appointed attorney, he is entitled to that attorney if his petition is not frivolous. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau I). In this 
context, a frivolous action is '"not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to bring at his own expense."' Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 135 
Idaho 676, 679 (2001) (in turn quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3))). Ultimately, this means that, 
"[i]f the petitioner 'alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim,"' counsel should 
be appointed in that case. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct App. 2009) (quoting 
Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793) (emphasis added). "Therefore, the trial court should 
appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such 
that a person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a 
further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007). 
There are several problems with the district court's denial of counsel in this case. 
First, in its notice of intent to dismiss, the court focused on the motion for appointment of 
counsel rather than the petition itself. The court stated, "Mr. O'Neil did not offer any 
specific facts as to the basis of his motion for the appointment of counsel. Instead, the 
Petitioner relied on general contentions regarding the ability to represent himself." 
(R., p.46.) Thus, the court deemed his motion for appointment of counsel to be 
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frivolous. (R., p.46.) However, in determining whether to appoint counsel, the court is 
required to look at the petition to see if it presents the possibility of a valid claim - not 
the motion for appointment of counsel. 
Second, in the order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district 
court concluded that, "Idaho courts have clearly determined that pro se litigants 'are not 
accorded special latitude .... "' (R., p.69) (quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 
220 (2009.) Thus, the court concluded that Mr. O'Neil was, "still held to the same 
standards and rules that every attorney in this jurisdiction is required to follow." 
(R., p.70.) 
At this stage of the proceeding, the district court was clearly incorrect. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has warned district courts to "keep in mind the admonition set forth in 
Brown about the typical problems with pro se pleadings." Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 
793. Specifically, "'the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed 
by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete."' Id. at 792 (quoting 
Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). To that point, '"facts sufficient to state a claim ... may not be 
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential 
elements of a claim."' Id. As such, where the pro se petitioner alleges some facts 
tending to support his claim, counsel should be appointed in his case. Charboneau I, 
140 Idaho at 793; Brown, 135 Idaho at 679. Therefore, when moving for appointment of 
counsel, Mr. O'Neil should not have beenheld to the same standards as an attorney. 
Finally, the court incorrectly determined that Mr. O'Neil's claims were frivolous. 
Mr. O'Neil alleged that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to an amount of 
restitution without his consent and for failing to file a motion to suppress. These are the 
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types of claims where an attorney could investigate and perhaps present a meritorious 
claim. Mr. O'Neil alleged that the restitution he owed was for crimes he did not commit 
and that the victim's property was returned on the crime for which he was convicted. He 
also alleged that the search of the vehicle was done prior to getting the owner's 
consent. These are possibly valid claims and the district court erred by denying 
appointment of counsel to investigate and refine them. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. O'Neil's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
Because he submitted evidence in support of his claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, Mr. O'Neil asserts that the district court erred when it determined that he had 
submitted only conclusory allegations, not evidence, in support of his claims. It 
therefore erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition on the pleadings and record is 
not proper if a material issue of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906(c). When genuine issues of 
material fact exist that would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's 
favor, summary disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
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and admissions together with any affidavits on file, and it liberally construes the facts 
and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 903 (2007) (hereinafter, Charboneau II). The lower court's legal conclusions 
are reviewed de nova. Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
When summary dismissal is an issue and the facts are disputed, a court is 
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true. Charboneau II, 
144 Idaho at 903. It does not, however, have to accept the petitioner's conclusions 
as to the impact of those facts on his claims. See id. Where the petitioner's factual 
allegations are rebutted and the case is still dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, 
"this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe 
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007). 
The only situations in which allegations contained in the application will be 
insufficient for relief is where they are either clearly disproved by the record or do not 
justify relief as a matter of law. Id. Where pleadings are verified, they are treated as 
affidavits and are admissible evidence in post-conviction proceedings. See Mata v. 
State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); I.C. § 19-4907(a). As such, Mr. O'Neil's 
verified pleadings constitute facts for this Court to consider. 
In his petition, Mr. O'Neil made two allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel: 1) that counsel entered into a stipulation for restitution without his knowledge 
and consent; and 2) that counsel failed to file a motion to suppress. (R., p.5.) "The test 
for determining whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel is the 
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two-part established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)]." McKeeth v. State. 140 Idaho 847, 850 
(2004). "The first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. The second prong requires the defendant to 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Accordingly, a post-conviction petition must establish that (1) a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether his trial counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material 
issue of fact exists as to whether that deficiency prejudiced his case. See Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, ·J 38 Idaho 76, 81 (2002). "To establish a deficiency, the applicant has 
the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, "the 
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Mr. O'Neil submits that the district court erred by determining that he alleged only 
bare and conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence. As set forth above, 
Mr. O'Neil's verified petition is evidence. With regard to restitution, Mr. O'Neil alleged 
that his trial attorney had initially informed him that any restitution would be illegal 
because everything found in Mr. O'Neil's possession was returned. (R., p.9.) However, 
according to Mr. O'Neil, the prosecutor sought restitution for a burglary for which 
Mr. O'Neil was never charged. (R., p.9.) Further, Mr. O'Neil asserted that the transcript 
of the sentencing hearing revealed that there was a dispute over restitution that would 
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be resolved at a subsequent hearing. (R., p.9.) The transcript confirms this. (R., p.31.) 
Mr. O'Neil then alleged that the hearing was held in his absence and that counsel 
stipulated to restitution even though restitution should never have been ordered. 
(R., pp.9-10.) Thus, Mr. O'Neil alleged both deficient performance (stipulating to 
restitution without his consent) and prejudice (a restitution award, where Mr. O'Neil 
believed restitution to be unlawful.) And considering that these allegations were made 
in an affidavit attached to a verified petition, they are evidence, not conclusory 
allegations. The district court therefore erred by dismissing this claim. 
With regard to failing to file a motion to suppress, Mr. O'Neil's affidavit averred 
that the search of the vehicle was done prior to getting the consent of the owner. 
(R., p.10.) He also attached a police report that indicated the search of the vehicle was 
done 10 minutes prior to the owner signing the consent form. (R., pp.26-27.) Thus, 
Mr. O'Neil was asserting that the search of the vehicle he was driving was unlawful. 
Thus, Mr. O'Neil alleged deficient performance (failure to file a motion to suppress) and 
prejudice (the search was illegal and therefore suppression was warranted). (R., p.10.) 
These were not conclusory allegations. They were assertions made in an affidavit and 
a verified petition, and the petition was supported by a Sheriff's Office Detail Incident 
Report. (R., pp.26-27.) Thus, the district court erred by concluding that Mr. O'Neil had 
submitted only conclusory allegations in support of his petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. O'Neil requests that the district court's order denying appointment of counsel 
and summarily dismissing his petition be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy '~te Appellate Public Defender 
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